Monday, August 3, 2020

Upon Reflection of the July 29th Hearing Conducted by the House Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee on Online Platforms and Market Power.


Knowing full well that the politicians had their own self-interests to advance when they were on the clock during the Hearing, I had to remain attentive and patient.  In between the orchestrated political grandstanding and wonderment if there was a question embedded in a lengthy statement by a committee member, there were some meaningful, on the record, exchanges during the more than five hours of testimony that made it worthwhile to stay tuned-in.  Upon reflection, here are my takeaways for each firm in terms of antitrust exposure.

Facebook
In hindsight, maybe the FTC should not have approved, without any action, Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram in 2012 for $1 billion and WhatsApp, two years later, for $19 billion.  After all, Section 7 of the Clayton Act states that regulators should prohibit mergers and acquisitions where the effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." In assessing market potential of the mobile photo app and messaging app, Facebook had the foresight to see the upsides to the acquisitions, achieving synergies while eliminating competitive threats.  Shame on regulators at the time for not evaluating fully the downside risks and challenging the mergers.  Hindsight is 2020.  Regulators should lick their wounds on this one and move on.    

Amazon
When a partner is a rival, business relationships get tricky.  Consider for a moment the streaming market.  Netflix, a platform owner, needs valued content to acquire and maintain subscriptions.  When Netflix started, all of the content it offered was licensed from third parties.  It spent a lot of money for that content from the likes of Disney, Comcast, and ViacomCBS.  Recognizing the potential risk of these business partners becoming streaming rivals one day, Netflix began creating its own content in 2012/2013.  It turns out it was a very good decision as these firms began going direct to consumers over the past few years and began pulling their content from Netflix.  Something they have every right to do. 

Where are the similarities with Amazon?  Amazon has partners too.  Lots of them. These partners sell their wares on the e-commerce platform.  Over 50 percent of sales volume is generated from third parties.  Ask yourself…If you developed a new product, would you look to sell it on Amazon in order to leverage the platform’s speed and scale?  It would be hard to say no, even when acknowledging the firm’s reputation for using the data on its partners to replicate successful product ideas.  While Amazon has policies against such behavior, there is strong evidence that it is happening.  Here is where external regulations are needed in place of internal guidelines. 
Amazon may also have some exposure in using predatory pricing on products like Echo to drive competitors out of the market. Bezos conceded that the firm uses promotional pricing on its smart speakers.  Legitimate pricing strategy?  Not when the below cost pricing is combined with monopoly power and has credibility because losses are financed or recouped from profits earned in other markets (e.g. AWS).

Google
Google is the firm most exposed just based of the actions already taken by the European Commission and what is anticipated from the DOJ by the end of the summer.  Google’s bottleneck and vertical soup-to-nuts control of search and display advertising was achieved largely through acquisitions of firms like DoubleClick and Applied Semantics (renamed AdSense).  The chokehold on serving, buying, and selling mobile and online advertising limits choice and unfairly advantages Google. 

Apple
Apple seemed to come out of the Hearings relatively unscathed.  Tim Cook did not get asked many questions, but, when he did, they were mostly centered on claims that the firm favored its own apps over those built by third parties.  The CEO was effective in deflecting any hint at favoritism by repeating that there were millions of third-party apps available on the Apple Store. 
Where I think there were missed opportunities to press Apple was on how it tied the launch of its new streaming service, Apple TV+, to purchases of its hardware.  Buyers of an iphone, ipad and other Apple devices got a free one-year subscription to Apple TV+.  It is why that one month after launch, Apple had amassed over 30 million subscribers on its platform.  Not bad!  When you consider the elements to support an antitrust violation of a tying claim, they are present here.  The biggest factor being that Apple has market power in the tying product (hardware) which it is extending into the tied service (streaming).  (Amazon has been doing the same things for years by bundling for free its Amazon prime video with its annual prime membership service.)

All Together
As operators of two-sided markets, these “new economy” firms incur high fixed-cost and low marginal cost with the development and sale of intellectual property.  They also benefit from network effects, collect and use big data, and have non-standard relationships between price and cost.  Dominance in each market came initially from signing up a critical mass of users on both sides of the market, and then maintained by continually innovating through growth and/or acquisitions.  
Again, dominance is not bad in and of itself.  It is when it is abused, that there should be concerns, even if it is perpetuated by the very tech companies we love as consumers.  It is why changes to how our antitrust laws are written or interpreted for these “new economy” firms will be challenging.  Lawmakers and regulators will have to check the rhetoric at the door and walk a fine line between being too aggressive and too lenient.  What are the chances they will get it right?