Seventy-years ago,
after World War II but prior to the jump in television set ownership, going to
the movies was the most popular form of entertainment for Americans. In
1948, 3,352 million people went to the movies (compared to 1,225 million in
2017). What they saw and where they
watched it were controlled by five vertically-integrated major studios and
three smaller ones. The stranglehold by
these firms included control of movie creation by signing actors and directors to
non-compete contracts and control of exhibition by owning first-run theaters or
contractually obligating independent theaters to purchase blocks of movies
(good and bad ones) without the ability to view them ahead of time (blind
bidding). Antitrust action was brought against
the 8 studios. In a case brought to it on
appeal, the Supreme Court ruled in United
States v. Paramount Pictures (1948) that vertically integrated studios must
divest their theaters and stop their anticompetitive and monopoly trade practices.
While most of these
studios still exist today in one form or the other, a lot has changed,
including the rise and subsequent disruption of the television industry by
technology that allows consumers to watch video content whenever and wherever
they want. Nearly 50% of theaters are
owned by just five firms (Regal Entertainment, AMC, Cinemark, Carmike, and
Cineplex) that operate multiple screens at each location. Content creation is now
for multiple platforms--the box office, the TV set, and electronic devices
connected to the internet.
But, while there are
new market participants with deep pockets creating content for the small
screens (e.g. Netflix, Amazon), the box office is still dominated by a handful
of media conglomerates. Between
1995-2018, the top 5 studios accounted for more than ¾ of domestic box office
receipts. Some part of each of these firms
was a defendant in the 1948 case. (The
other three defendants were RKO, MGM, and United Artist.) While movie attendance is down relative to
1948, how a film does at the box office matters greatly to today’s
vertically-integrated giants’ successes with downstream distribution, licensing
deals, and merchandising sales.
Studio
|
1995-2018 Market Share of Domestic Box
Office**
|
Walt
Disney/20th Century Fox*
|
27.79
|
AT&T
(Warner Brothers/New Line)
|
15.12
|
Sony/Columbia
Pictures
|
12.10
|
Comcast
(Universal)
|
11.45
|
Viacom
(Paramount)
|
10.69
|
* pending acquisition; **US, Can, Guam,
PR
Source: Statista
|
77.15
|
In early August as
part of its initiative to terminate or modify legacy antitrust judgments that
no longer serve to protect competition, the Department of Justice launched a
review of the Paramount consent decrees.
As part of its review, it requested interested parties to submit
comments on the following issues by October 4th:
- Do the Paramount Decrees continue to serve important
competitive purposes today?
- Individually, or collectively, are the decree
provisions relating to (1) movie distributors owning movie theatres; (2)
block booking; (3) circuit dealing; (4) resale price maintenance; and (5)
overbroad clearances necessary to protect competition? Are any of these
provisions ineffective in protecting competition or inefficient? Do any of
these provisions inhibit competition or cause anticompetitive effects?
- What, if any, modifications to the Paramount Decrees
would enhance competition and efficiency? What legal justifications would
support such modifications, if any?
- What effect, if any, would the termination of the
Paramount Decrees have on the distribution and exhibition of motion
pictures?
- Have changes to the motion picture industry since
the 1940s, including but not limited to, digital production and
distribution, multiplex theatres, new distribution and movie viewing
platforms render any of the Consent Decree provisions unnecessary?
- Are existing antitrust laws, including, the
precedent of United States v. Paramount, and its progeny,
sufficient or insufficient to protect competition in the motion picture
industry?
I would argue that the
provisions of the consent decree that prevent studios from owning theaters (for
the most part) and prohibit anticompetitive vertical restraints (e.g. block
booking and circuit dealing) should remain in place. There are no pro-competitive justifications
to remove them. The media giants are
bigger and more vertically-integrated than ever. They have tremendous market power. Regulators should be on the lookout for
anticompetitive behavior (e.g. foreclosure, bundling, exclusive dealings) across
all content delivery platforms. In fact,
the Paramount case provisions matter more today, not less.
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